RESPONSE

WEAK SOLUTIONS TO AN ILLUSORY PROBLEM

STEVEN N. KAPLAN

†

In response to Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for LongTerm Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010).
In Paying For Long-Term Performance, Professors Bebchuk and Fried
describe how equity-based compensation in the United States should
do a better job of tying top executive pay more closely to long-term
1
performance. The primary assumption the authors and their proposals make is that “standard executive pay arrangements . . . lead[]
executives to focus excessively on the short term . . . at the expense of
2
long-term value[,]” and do in fact “reward[] executives for short-term
3
gains that do not reflect long-term performance.” They also heavily ref4
erence the financial crisis as a motivation for improving compensation.
The recommendations and the article have two major shortcomings. First, Bebchuk and Fried provide little evidence to support their
motivating assumption that executive-pay practices reward executives
for short-term results that do not reflect long-term performance. One
of the “authorities” they cite is Secretary of the Treasury Timothy
5
Geithner, who is not known for his expertise on corporate gover†

Neubauer Family Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance, University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
1
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1915, 1915-16 (2010).
2
Id. at 1917.
3
Id. at 1916.
4
See, e.g., id. at 1956 (“In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008–2009, there
is a growing recognition among firms, investors, and public officials that equity-based
compensation awarded to the top executives of public firms should be tied to longterm results.”).
5
See, e.g., id. at 1917 (noting Geithner’s urging of corporate boards to structure
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nance (or taxation). In reality, there is a great deal of evidence that
top U.S. executives are paid for good long-term performance and penalized for poor long-term performance. This is true for firms in
general—nonfinancial and financial. Even the claim on which Bebchuk and Fried focus—that top executive compensation was a first6
order cause of the financial crisis —is not supported by the evidence.
Second, Bebchuk and Fried tend to overstate the benefits of their
proposals while understating the costs. Because top executive pay is
already effectively tied to long-term performance, the Bebchuk and
Fried proposals, at best, provide marginal improvements to a system
that already works well. At the same time, they ignore the additional
costs. Their proposals require executives to bear more risk (from a
lack of diversification) and are likely to dissuade some of the most talented executives from taking jobs at public companies in the first
place. This would be particularly true for top executives who can
work for private-equity-funded companies (which do not impose such
restrictions) as well as for lawyers who can choose between a law partnership and a general-counsel job. In many cases, the costs of the
Bebchuk and Fried proposals likely exceed the benefits.
In this Response, I expand on my arguments and present substantial empirical evidence to support them. Part I assesses the assumption that executive pay practices, in general, reward executives for
short-term results that do not reflect long-term performance. Part II
assesses whether the assumption holds for financial firms and whether
compensation was a first-order cause of the financial crisis. Part III
considers whether the Bebchuk and Fried proposals improve on existing compensation arrangements. The last Part concludes.
I. ARE EXECUTIVES REWARDED FOR GOOD AND PUNISHED
FOR POOR LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE?
Bebchuk and Fried claim that “standard executive pay arrangements . . . lead[] executives to focus excessively on the short term . . .
7
at the expense of long-term value[,]” and in fact “reward[] executives
8
for short-term gains that do not reflect long-term performance.”
They do not present empirical evidence that this is the case. Rather,
they rely on statements from public officials like Geithner and Special
compensation with an eye to long-term performance).
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1917.
8
Id. at 1916.
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9

Pay Master Kenneth Feinberg, who can hardly be considered serious
scholars of corporate governance.
If Bebchuk and Fried are correct, there should not be much of a
relation between long-term stock performance and the pay that top
executives realize in a particular year. Joshua Rauh and I posed this
exact question and found that, in reality, there is a strong relationship
10
between top executive pay and long-term stock performance.
Rauh and I took all the firms in the Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database and sorted them into five groups based on size (as11
sets) for each year from 1999 to 2004. There are more than 1600
12
public companies in the ExecuComp database in any particular year.
We sorted based on size, because it is well established that pay is tied
13
to firm size. Within each size group for each year, we sorted the
CEOs into five groups based on how much compensation they actually
14
realized—salary, bonus, restricted stock, and exercised options. It is
worth mentioning that this measure of pay includes gains or losses
15
We then
from any of the gaming Bebchuk and Fried describe.
looked at how the stocks of each group performed relative to their in16
dustry over the previous one, three, and five years.
Actual compensation was highly related to firm stock performance
over all three periods. Firms with CEOs in the top quintile of actual
pay were the top-performing quintile relative to their industries in
17
every size group. Firms with CEOs in the bottom quintile of actual
pay were the worst-performing quintile relative to their industries in
18
every size group. And the magnitudes of the performance differenc19
es are large. Figure 1 (Figure 3 in the paper) presents the results
graphically for three years of performance. The results are graphical-

9

Id. at 1917-18.
See Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes
to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1004, 1043-45 (2010).
11
Id. at 1044.
12
See id. at 1008 (noting that there were 1747 companies in the database in 1994
and 1722 in 2004).
13
Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123
Q.J. ECON. 49, 50 (2008).
14
Kaplan & Rauh, supra note 10, at 1008.
15
See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 1936 (defining gaming as “springloading,
selling on private information, and manipulating the stock price”).
16
Kaplan & Rauh, supra note 10, at 1044.
17
Id. at 1044-45.
18
Id. at 1045.
19
See id. at 1044-45 (noting that firms with CEOs in the top quintile of compensation outperform their industries by 61% on average).
10
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20

ly, qualitatively, and statistically identical for five years —a period that
most would characterize as long-term.
FIGURE 1: THREE-YEAR PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO
VALUE-WEIGHTED INDUSTRY (CEOS ONLY)

The previous analysis is across firms within a given year. It also is
possible to see the relationship across time. Figure 2 presents the average pay realized by S&P 500 CEOs (adjusted for inflation) against
the level of the S&P 500 from 1998 to 2008. It is difficult to miss the
strong relationship between pay and the overall stock market.

20

See also Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley, Executive Compensation: Facts
13-15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15426, 2009) (finding qualitatively similar results). A recent Wall Street Journal article also reaches a similar conclusion. See Scott Thurm, Measuring Bang for the Buck: Best-Paid Corporate Chiefs Tend to
Deliver Above-Average Shareholder Returns, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2010, at B5.
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FIGURE 2: REALIZED CEO PAY AGAINST THE
S&P 500 (INFLATION-ADJUSTED)

The Bebchuk and Fried analysis also assumes that CEOs are not
penalized much for poor performance. Jenter and Lewellen studied
this issue by examining CEO turnover for companies in the S&P ExecuComp database and found that boards aggressively fire CEOs for
21
poor performance.
For example, in a CEO’s first five years, 59% of CEOs in the bottom quintile of industry-adjusted stock performance (over those five
years) lose their jobs, compared to 17% of CEOs in the top quintile of
22
performance. Jenter and Lewellen find similar results for the fourth
quintile versus the second quintile, with 51% of CEOs in the fourth
23
quintile turning over, compared to 20% in the second quintile.
The penalty for poor performance is even greater in companies
with what Jenter and Llewellen refer to as “higher quality” boards—
smaller boards with fewer insiders and higher board stock ownership.
CEO turnover is 83% in the bottom quintile versus 10% in the top
24
quintile.
The result for higher-quality boards is particularly interesting because boards have gotten smaller and have included fewer insiders

21

Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, Performance-Induced CEO Turnover 18-26
(Feb. 2010) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~djenter/CEO_
Turnover_February_2010.pdf.
22
Id. at 26.
23
Id. at 36 fig.2.
24
Id. at 37 fig.3.
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25

over the last twenty years, suggesting that governance has improved.
Again, the performance measure is not short-term stock performance,
but performance over a five-year period.
To summarize the results in this Part, there is strong evidence that
CEOs are compensated—both positively and negatively—for longterm stock performance.
II. DID POOR TOP-EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES
PRECIPITATE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS?
Bebchuk and Fried propose their solutions for two types of
firms—financial and nonfinancial. Their motivation, however, focuses heavily on financial firms and the financial crisis. Bebchuk and
Fried claim that the financial crisis has led to “widespread recognition
that pay arrangements that reward executives for short-term results
26
can produce incentives to take excessive risks.” The previous Part
argued that there is little evidence that this is a systemic problem for
firms in general. In this Part, I argue that it is even questionable
whether poor top-executive incentives at financial firms played an important role in precipitating the financial crisis.
The poor-pay-practice explanation for the financial crisis implies
that “[t]op bank executives were rewarded for short-term results with
large amounts of up-front cash pay,” “[b]ank executives did not hold
sufficiently large amounts of stock to align their interests with those of
shareholders,” and “[e]xecutives with more short-term pay and less
stock ownership should have had the greatest incentive to take bad
and excessive risks, and, so, should have performed worse in the cri27
sis.”
Fahlenbrach and Stulz tested these implications by studying the
28
CEOs of almost 100 large financial institutions from 2006 to 2008.
In 2006, the mean CEO took home $3.6 million in cash compensation

25

See also Steven A. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover
Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOs 25 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W12465, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=924751 (finding a stronger relationship between turnover and performance than previous empirical studies).
26
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 1917.
27
Steven N. Kaplan, Should Banker Pay Be Regulated?, THE ECONOMIST’S VOICE,
Dec. 2009, at 1, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss11/art6/ .
28
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis
(Ohio St. U. Working Paper No. 2009-03-013, 2009).
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(representing less than half of total compensation).
The larger
share of pay was in restricted stock and options. At the same time, the
30
mean CEO held $88 million worth of the firm’s equity and options.
In other words, the average CEO took home $3.6 million in cash while
leaving more than twenty-four times as much money in his or her
firm. It seems unlikely that up-front cash pay provided much of an incentive for the average CEO to knowingly take bad or excessive risks
that would jeopardize his or her much larger equity stakes and his or
her job. CEOs lost a great deal in the crisis. From 2006 to 2008, the average CEO lost $31 million in stock value, dwarfing any gains from cash com31
pensation. CEOs lost large amounts on their options as well.
These (and additional) results lead Fahlenbrach and Stulz to conclude that bank “CEO incentives . . . cannot be blamed for the credit
32
crisis or for the performance of banks during that crisis.”
Kevin Murphy presents a similar analysis for TARP and non-TARP
banks, as well as quantitatively similar results, in his Congressional tes33
timony.
David Yermack agrees that many prominent financial executives
34
lost “small fortunes” in 2008. He adds that “farther down the ladder,
most mid- and upper-level managers of financial companies also lost a
35
significant amount of their net worth in 2008.” Yermack concludes
that “[t]he recent scrutiny of executive pay seems to stem from an odd
36
mix of envy and vengeance, unsupported by facts or theories.”
Murphy and Yermack, noted researchers on CEO pay, have written articles highly critical of specific CEO compensation practices.
Nevertheless, their conclusions on the relation of CEO pay to the financial crisis are diametrically opposed to those of Bebchuk and Fried.
Benjamin J. Keys et al. studied mortgage loan origination and
“d[id] not find any relationship between the quality of loan origina37
tions and top management incentives.” Instead, they found that “a
proxy of relative power of the risk manager is associated with loans
29

Id. at 34 tbl.3.
Id.
31
Id. at 24.
32
Id. at 25.
33
Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servcs., 111th Cong. 3-10 (2009) (testimony of Kevin J. Murphy, Chair in Finance, University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business).
34
David Yermack, Keeping the Pay Police at Bay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11–12, 2009, at W1.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Benjamin J. Keys et al., Financial Regulation and Securitization? Evidence from Subprime Loans, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 700, 719 (2009).
30
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that have lower default rates.” They interpreted this result to suggest “that
the moral hazard problem is less severe for lenders in which the risk man38
agement department has greater bargaining power within the firm.”
To be fair, one paper is modestly favorable to Bebchuk and Fried.
Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman studied whether short-termism leads
39
to excessive risk taking in financial firms. Partially because the traditional and intuitive measure of incentives Fahlenbrach and Stulz use is
not correlated with excessive risk, Cheng et al. created a somewhat
complicated and unintuitive measure of residual compensation. They
found that financial firms that paid higher residual compensation had
modestly higher stock volatility and lower stock returns from 2001 to
40
2008.
The results on returns were driven largely by insurance
41
firms. Even in their conclusion, however, Cheng et al. were not willing to agree with the Bebchuk and Fried assumption and concluded
42
that the modest relationship was not necessarily causal.
Bebchuk and Fried do not mention any of these studies that fail to
support their assumptions. Rather, the only relevant evidence they
cite is from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann: that executives at Bear
Stearns and Lehman cashed out almost $2 billion of equity from 2000
to 2008, an amount (slightly) greater than the value of their holdings
43
at the start of 2008. The inference they intend to make is that the
Bear Stearns and Lehman executives knowingly behaved in a shortterm manner and were able to cash out.
Unfortunately, that analysis leaves out one extremely important
detail—taxes. Most compensation in those firms was in the form of
restricted stock. When restricted stock vests, the executive owes taxes
on the award. For New York residents (including many of the executives), the combined federal and state marginal tax rate over this pe44
riod was well over 40% and as high as 50%. Is it surprising then, that
38

Id.
Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison Hong & Jose A. Scheinkman, Yesterday’s Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16176, 2010).
40
Id. at 3.
41
Id. at 15-16.
42
Id. at 28.
43
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 267-73 (2010).
44
The top federal tax rate was 39.6% in 2000, 39.1% in 2001, 38.6% in 2002 and
35% from 2003-2008. TAX FOUND., U.S. FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX HISTORY,
1913–2010 (2010),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/151.html. The Medicare tax rate is
39
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the executives sold a little more than 50% of their shares over the period?
A large fraction of those sale proceeds undoubtedly went to pay taxes.
To see this, suppose that an executive is awarded $100 million in
restricted stock. When the award vests, the executive owes $45 million
in taxes. Now, let’s say the executive sells $50 million of the $100 million vested stock. In that case, $45 million would go to pay taxes and
the executive would retain $5 million in cash. At the same time, the
executive would still hold $50 million in vested stock. Net of taxes,
then, the executive still has an extremely strong incentive to maximize
long-term shareholder value. Her remaining stock is worth ten times
the cash she has realized.
The Bebchuk et al. analysis inexplicably ignores taxes. They assume that the executive gets to keep the $50 million he sold (not the
$5 million the executive really ends up with) while retaining $50 million in
stock. In their analysis, the executive has an incentive to take risks be45
cause he takes a lot of money out of the company. By ignoring taxes,
Bebchuk and Fried greatly overestimate the amount of money executives actually realize. At a 45% tax rate, they overestimate the amount
by a factor of ten.
In other words, an after-tax analysis would likely find that the Bear
Stearns and Lehman executives’ after-tax realizations from stock sales
were on the order of 10% of what they lost on their remaining shares—
not the roughly equal amount claimed by Bebchuk et al. This, by the
way, is a general point applicable to the entire Bebchuk and Fried analysis. In ignoring taxes, they overstate the extent of the problem.
If front-loaded incentives did not play a major role in the crisis,
what did? Taylor points to the highly expansionist monetary policy in
46
the years leading up to the crisis. Diamond and Rajan cite the socalled capital glut—large inflows of external capital from much of the
1.45% for employees and 2.9% for people who are self-employed. Social Security Online, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/taxRates.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
As of February 1, 2010, the New York State top marginal tax rate was 6.85% to 7.7%.
TAX FOUND., STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES, 1913-2010 (2010)
http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/228.html. In 2009, the New York City
top
marginal
tax
rate
was
3.65%.
NYC
Finance,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/services/business_tax_nys_income.shtml
(last
visited Oct. 18, 2010).
45
See Bebchuck et al., supra note 43, at 271 (characterizing the value of remaining
shares for Bear Stearns and Lehman executives as “relatively modest” and “nonexistent” respectively).
46
See John B. Taylor, The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong 2-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14631,
2009) (noting deviations by the Federal Reserve from traditional monetary policies
employed during long periods of strong growth).
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developing world. Calomiris highlights the role that the political system played in inflating the banking sector and real estate prices, particularly the subprime sector, through mandates implemented by
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and others to promote low-income hous48
ing. Ruling out compensation practices hardly leaves us at a loss for
culprits in the recent debacle.
In sum, Bebchuk and Fried’s claim that short-term top executive
incentives led to excessive risk taking and strongly contributed to the
financial crisis is not supported by the preponderance of the empirical
evidence. At best, it is debatable.
III. DO THE BEBCHUK-FRIED PROPOSALS DELIVER
BENEFITS IN EXCESS OF COSTS?
In the first two Parts, I presented evidence that the problem Bebchuk and Fried assume is overstated. Top executive compensation
and turnover are, in fact, tied to long-term performance. As a result,
adopting the Bebchuk and Fried proposals can provide, at best, modest marginal benefits to the existing governance arrangements that already work well. At the same time, their proposals also impose additional costs.
This Part weighs the marginal benefits of the
recommendations against the potential costs. Bebchuk and Fried
make recommendations in three general areas: unwinding, hedging,
and timing. I address each area below.
A. Unwinding
Bebchuk and Fried recommend that executives should be restricted from unwinding equity-based awards and allowed to do so only gradually after vesting, subject to aggregate unwinding limitations.
The idea is to make sure that executives have incentives to focus on
the long-term stock price.
Such restrictions might make sense for some executives at some
companies. But that Bebchuk and Fried claim a benefit fails to estab-

47

See Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram Rajan, The Credit Crisis: Conjectures About
Causes and Remedies 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14739,
2009) (explaining that many emerging-market countries became net lenders of capital
during the late 1990s).
48
See Charles Calomiris, Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game 55 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15403, 2009) (suggesting that housing policies
exacerbated incentives for subprime risk taking).

2010]

Weak Solutions to an Illusory Problem

53

lish that there is a marginal benefit to this policy—and ignores the potential costs.
First, Bebchuk and Fried argue that by reducing unwinding, firms
will not have to replenish equity grants and therefore can pay their
49
executives less. This makes no sense in a world where there is a
functioning market for top executives. Top executives will see to it
that they are paid the going market wage. It is not clear there is any
marginal benefit here.
Second, they acknowledge that many companies now impose
50
some type of ownership guidelines on top executives. They criticize
these other ownership guidelines as ineffective, but do not provide
any supporting evidence. For example, Bebchuk and Fried criticize
the guideline that executives must hold stock worth a multiple of their
annual compensation. They argue that these requirements are often
too low and cite Procter & Gamble and Verizon as requiring their
51
CEOs to hold too little company equity. But even those two specially
chosen examples contradict the Bebchuk and Fried criticisms. The
CEO of Procter & Gamble, A.G. Lafley, in fact, owned more than $100
52
million in stock and options while the CEO of Verizon, Ivan Seiden53
berg, owned more than $60 million. For both, the ownership stakes
arguably provided substantial incentive to manage for the long term.
It is hard to see much of a marginal benefit to making it more difficult
to unwind those positions than it already is.
Bebchuk and Fried also criticize guidelines that require executives
54
to hold a certain amount of stock until retirement. They argue that
55
this may encourage executives to retire early. While this may matter
in a small number of cases, it is not clear that it matters much. More
importantly, it is not clear the Bebchuk and Fried proposal is any better. By requiring executives to remain undiversified for a long time,
the Bebchuk and Fried solution also gives executives strong incentives
to leave their current employers to work elsewhere. Under their proposal, a job-switching executive obtains the same total compensation,

49

Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 1933.
Id. at 1934.
51
Id. at 1934-35.
52
Procter & Gamble Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 42 (Aug.
28, 2009).
53
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 43
(Mar. 23, 2009).
54
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 1925-28.
55
Id. at 1927.
50
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obtains diversification, and probably is able to unwind more quickly
from his or her first company.
Furthermore, the Bebchuk and Fried pay proposals—increasing
the period between the time stock is issued as compensation and the
56
time it can be sold net of taxes —would not have stopped the executives at Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill, and elsewhere from selling
many of their shares before the crisis. As I mentioned above, a large
fraction of the selling by those executives was likely driven by tax payments which Bebchuk and Fried acknowledge are allowed under their
proposal. Under the Bebchuk and Fried proposals, many of the executives—Cayne (Bear Stearns), Fuld (Lehman), and Lewis (Bank of
America)—would have been eligible to sell a substantial amount of
their remaining equity because they had long tenures and received
large amounts of restricted stock and options in the 1990s and 1980s.
The foregoing argues that there is unclear or little marginal benefit to the Bebchuk and Fried unwinding proposals over current practice. In addition, there are (at least) two important costs to the proposals that Bebchuk and Fried do not mention.
First, as already mentioned, the unwinding proposals (and to
some extent the timing proposals) make it more difficult for executives to diversify their personal portfolios. This imposes additional (but
difficult to quantify) costs on the executives. One suspects some executives would choose to diversify by going to work for other companies.
Second, it also seems likely that the restrictions would dissuade
some of the most talented executives from taking jobs at public companies in the first place. This would be particularly true for top executives who can work for private-equity-funded companies (which do
not impose such restrictions upon exit) and lawyers who can choose
between a law partnership and a general counsel job.
On the whole, then, Bebchuk and Fried fail to make a convincing
case that their unwinding proposals improve much, if at all, upon current practice.
B. Hedging
Bebchuk and Fried recommend that top executives be restricted
57
from hedging their equity positions. This recommendation is sensible but, again, addresses a problem that hardly exists. The net benefit

56
57

Id. at 1928-30.
Id. at 1954.
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is negligible. Bebchuk and Fried claim that “[a] recent empirical
study by Bettis, Bizjak, and Kalpathy confirms the significance of the
58
problem.” The fact is that Bettis et al. confirm the opposite: very
few companies now allow their top executives to hedge. To see this,
one has only to look at table 1 of Bettis et al. In 2005 and 2006, the
last two years they studied, an average of fewer than fifty firms each
59
year allowed their executives to hedge. And roughly 20% of those
hedges used exchange funds that the authors find have no negative
60
timing attributes.
The paper, therefore, finds potentially costly
hedging behavior in roughly forty public firms a year out of the more
than 5000 companies publicly traded on U.S. exchanges. This is a
rate of less than 1%. I would not call this significant.
C. Timing
Bebchuk and Fried recommend making it more difficult for top
executives to affect the timing of equity-based grants and equity-based
61
realizations. Those recommendations are sensible and do not have
any obvious costs. But many companies already follow these recommendations, suggesting there is a small marginal benefit to existing
practices. Many companies award options at set dates. Many require
equity sales to occur over time through 10b5-1 plans. Fewer companies appear to require predisclosure of such sales. To the extent
companies do not follow these recommendations yet, they are well advised to consider them.
CONCLUSION
On the whole, the Bebchuk and Fried proposals address a problem that is already largely solved. Boards and compensation committees already pay a great deal of attention to motivating top executives
to manage for long-term shareholder value. Accordingly, most firms
already implement policies that deliver most of the benefits of the
Bebchuk and Fried proposals. This is reflected in the strong empirical relation of top executive compensation and turnover to performance—a relation Bebchuk and Fried do not acknowledge.
58

Id. at 1951 (citing Carr Bettis, John Bizjak & Swaminathan Kalpathy, Why Do
Insiders Hedge Their Ownership and Options? An Empirical Examination (Mar.
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364810.
59
Bettis et al., supra note 58, at 53 tbl.1.
60
See id. at 6 (“[T]he evidence suggests that exchange funds are more likely to be
used purely as a diversification strategy.”).
61
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 1937-41.
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The cost of these proposals (and articles like Bebchuk and
Fried’s) is that they continue to treat CEOs and boards with more
skepticism and hostility than is justified by the empirical evidence.
That hostility diffuses to the media and the political arena, where it
can have real and negative effects in leading to costly and unnecessary
regulations. Although it is difficult to quantify, there also can be little
doubt that the hostility dissuades able executives from taking on top
executive roles at public companies.
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